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What is a fair wage?
Reference points, Entitlements and Gift Exchange

Eleonora Bottino, Cintia Goddio and Praveen Kujal1

Abstract: Society adopts institutions that can change incentives, reference points and
entitlements for the economic agents. In this paper we look at two stylized wage setting
institutions and their effect on wage offers and effort in the classic gift exchange experiments
of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). The first one is the exogenously imposed minimum
wage institution (first instituted in New Zealand in 1894). The second institution we look is
an endogenous wage proposal institution where workers first make wage proposals. We find
that the imposition of an exogenous minimum wage floor at the competitive outcome lowers
average wage offers. However, workers do not negatively reciprocate and continue to offer
high effort. In the second institution workers make non-binding (endogenous) minimum wage
proposals. The introduction of endogenous minimum wage proposals marginally increases
wage offers while, average effort decreases when wage proposals are not matched. Finally,
relative to the baseline, overall efficiency with the non-binding minimum wage decreases,
while, efficiency is only slightly higher under endogenous minimum wage proposals. We find
that clear evidence that the institutional structure has important implications towards wage
offers, effort and efficiency.

JEL Codes: J2, J3.
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1 Introduction2
Private contracts are an intimate part of the fabric of exchange and are relied upon for the
consummation of various economic transactions. Such contracts emerge endogenously,
require little monitoring and (for this reason) are the preferred vehicle for economic
transactions. However, when such interactions don’t function as perceived then society
imposes institutions (through legislation) to supposedly “correct the wrong”. Examples of
such instances are the renewed financial legislation after the recent crisis, laws that ensure
enforcement of contracts, labor market legislation, etc. It is clear that behind the imposition of
these institutions is the perception that society can undo the wrong, or at the least mitigate it
to some extent.
Freeman (2008), for example, recognizes that wage-setting institutions can affect
economic performance in three ways: they “alter incentives” and hence the actions of the
participating agents, they “facilitate efficient bargaining,” and they “increase information,
communication, and trust”. However, we know from the experimental literature that the
imposition of these institutions can also alter reference points, or entitlements, for the
economic agents and alter behavior in subsequent periods (see for example the literature on
price and quantity controls3).
The imposition of these institutions is, however, not neutral towards the actions of the
agents (that form the institution) nor towards the outcomes. One can expect that a change in
rules that govern an institution will change the incentives for the market participants and
hence their actions. It is in this light the experimental approach is very useful in that one can
clearly study how changes in institutional rules alter agent actions. For example, Falk et al.
(2006) show that the imposition of a non-binding minimum wage can change reference points
2
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both for workers and firms. They find that the imposition of a non-binding minimum wage
changes reservation wages which results in a rise in subjects’ reservation wages that persists
even after the minimum wage has been removed. This is a clear example of how seemingly
neutral events can change reference points and hence outcomes.
The imposition of the minimum wage legislation was motivated by the
perception that markets on their own do not provide “fair” compensation towards the lower
end of the wage strata. Interestingly, this contrasts with the experimental results of Fehr et al.
(1993) where they find support for the fair wage hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982) in a free market
setting. They observe reciprocity in employer-employee relationships where fair wage offers
are reciprocated with higher effort and vice versa. The interesting question to thus ask is
regarding the effect of imposing such legislation on the mutual reciprocity.
In this paper we look at how the imposition of labor market institutions impact wages
and worker effort, and subsequently market efficiency. The imposition of an institution (or
rules) may create reference points or a sense of entitlement for employers and workers alike.
Given this we look at simplified versions of two wage setting institutions. The first one,
exogenously imposed, is the minimum wage institution. The minimum wage legislation was
first enacted in New Zealand in 1894 and its primary goal was to ensure “fair” compensation
to workers4. Since then, minimum wage laws have been widely enacted across the world5.
There is much debate among economists on the benefits and the drawbacks of the
introduction of a minimum wage6. It is widely accepted that this institution, which is
supposed to ensure a reasonable wage to low skill workers, is ultimately motivated by
fairness concerns.

Its intention was to guarantee a “minimum standard of living to workers”.
Almost all countries in the top ten ranking of the Heritage Foundation 2009 Index of Economic Freedom report
have minimum wage laws keeping in mind fairness concerns.
6
There is evidence that institutions reduce inequality, however, how institutions affect aggregate economic
outcomes is not clear (Freeman, 2008).
4
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The second institution we look at is an institution that tries to capture a structure
where workers propose a minimum acceptable wage. Under this institution the minimum
wage proposal is endogenously determined, however, it is not binding on the employers.
Workers make individual wage proposals and then the average of all proposals is presented to
the employers as the “wage proposal”. This institution reflects a scenario where workers
collectively make a one-time wage proposal to the employers. We chose this institution over a
wage bargaining institution with repeated offers due to its simplicity and that it reflects an
essential feature of wage bargaining institutions where (initial) endogenous wage proposals
come from workers. We feel that making wage proposals should give a sense of entitlement
(to that wage) to workers.
Exogenously imposed minimum wage or an endogenous minimum wage proposal
should have different impact on labor markets. The minimum wage may provide a reference
point to employers while the endogenous wage proposal may result in expectations of
entitlement to that wage for the workers.
Given this we study the effect of imposing an exogenous, and endogenous, minimum
wage institution in a gift exchange environment. We are interested in studying how the
imposition of the minimum wage institution impacts private fairness in the Fehr et al. (1993)
gift exchange experiment. We first replicate the findings in Fehr et al. and then study the
effect of exogenously imposing the minimum wage institution on average wage. We find
support for the crowding out of private fairness with average wage offers declining across all
periods. Interestingly a higher proportion of the wage offers are made around the minimum
wage. The exogenously imposed minimum wage partially crowds out fairness concerns in
employer-employee relationship. Interestingly, even though wage offers decline, effort levels
do not. Wage-effort reciprocity is thus also crowded out.

4

In the endogenous wage proposals institutions workers make a non-binding minimum
wage proposal. We find that average wage offers increase, however, effort levels decrease.
Endogenous wage proposals crowd out worker reciprocity when wage proposals are not met
by employers. If proposed wage offers are not met, workers reciprocate negatively decreasing
effort levels.
Similar to Falk et al (2006) we also show that institutions can change reference points
for workers and the firms. We provide an interesting extension to the standard competitive
model in the sense that the standard model generally assumes that only the level of payoffs
matters. However, it might be that the gains are indeed evaluated relative to a reference point
or worker expectations7. Therefore, if people have reference-dependent fairness preferences,
policy measures may affect these points relative to which workers evaluate the fairness of
their employment situation8. The exogenous, as well as the endogenous, introduction of a
minimum wage in a competitive market may thus change the reference point according to
which employers, or employee, judge an offer as fair or unfair. For the same reason, the
introduction of a minimum wage may affect the wages offered by the employers and,
ultimately, the employees' decisions about the effort levels.
Literature review:
Some papers have looked at how exogenously, or endogenously, determined wages affect
worker performance in the work environment. The closest to ours is (Falk, Fehr and Zehnder,
2006). They study the effect of imposing a non-binding minimum wage on worker
preferences and its impact on entitlements. They elicit reservation wages from workers using
the strategy method. Any wage offer above (below) the reservation wage is automatically
accepted (rejected). They show that the imposition of a non-binding minimum wage affects
people´s reservation wage. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in
7
8

As in Falk et al. (2006).
Falk et al (2006) make a similar point with regard to worker entitlements.
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subjects’ reservation wages which persists even after the minimum wage has been removed.
They do not analyze the effect over the effort of the workers but over their reservation wage.
Their findings suggest that the cause of the change in the reservation wage is the change in
the perception of what is considered to be a fair wage. They argue that public policies can
affect behavior not only through changing behavior but by also shaping perceptions of
entitlements and thus, reservation values (p 1351). As in their paper we also show that
institutional arrangements can also shape wage expectations (entitlements) and hence effort.
Brandts and Charness (2004), study the impact on gift exchange of both, the
competitive imbalance (both, an excess of supply (workers) and an excess of demand
(employers)). They assert that although there is a lot of evidence about the gift-exchange
phenomenon, however, the motivation behind its occurrence is lacking. They introduce a
binding minimum wage to obtain an excess supply of workers and find that gift exchange is
not altered with different conditions in the competitive imbalance. However, the effort
provision declines when a binding minimum wage is introduced. The introduction of a
binding minimum wage seems to lower effort provision at all wages and also decreases the
probability of a high wage is offer.
Another set of papers has looked at how control (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) or
endogenizing decisions (Charness et al, 2012) can impact worker performance. Falk et al.
(2006) look at how exogenously imposed performance targets can be counter-productive and
affect employee performance. In their setup an outside imposition of effort level is construed
as in indication of distrust and is negatively reciprocated. Charness et al. (2012), meanwhile,
study the effect of delegating the wage decision to employees on employee performance.
Delegating the wage decision implies that wages are endogenously determined in their
structure. They find that delegation significantly increases employee effort with performance
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increasing for the same wage levels. Finally, earnings of both employers and employees
increase under this setup.

2. Experimental Design
We are interested in studying how the introduction of the minimum wage institution,
exogenous and endogenous, alters reference points or entitlements in labor markets. The
externally imposed minimum wage provides a reference point for employers while the
endogenously chosen wage proposal provides an entitlement wage to workers. Our
experimental design consists of three treatments, the Baseline treatment (BASE, henceforth),
the Exogenous Minimum Price treatment (EXO, henceforth) and the Endogenous Minimum
Price treatment (ENDO, henceforth). The BASE is the free market setting as in Fehr et al
(1993). In the second set of experiments we introduce an exogenous non binding minimum
wage set at the competitive market wage9. A competitive minimum wage is a reasonable
place to start as, a priori10, the imposition of a minimum wage at that level should not affect
wage-effort outcomes11. We conjecture that the exogenously imposed competitive minimum
wage will provide reference points to employers pushing the average wage downwards.
In the third set of experiments we introduce a non-binding endogenous minimum
wage proposal from the employees. We feel that making minimum wage proposals gives
workers an entitlement to what they consider as a fair wage. In this treatment each employee
is asked to make a minimum acceptable wage offer and then the average of all the offers is
taken to be the “initial wage proposal”. The minimum acceptable wage proposal is nonbinding and in theory this should not affect wage offers, or effort levels, from workers. We
conjecture that a minimum wage proposal will create entitlements for workers on what they
9

The minimum wage is introduced at the competitive level.
The experimental evidence on price (wages) and quantity controls suggests to the contrary (Isaac and Plott
(1981), Smith and Williams (1981), Coursey and Smith (1984), Kujal (1994), Falk et al (2004)).
11
We, however, know from earlier experimental literature that this is not the case. Even non-binding price, or
quantity, levels impact agent behavior.
10
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perceive as a fair wage and if not reciprocated may induce negative reciprocity with workers
responding with lower effort levels. It would be interesting to see whether fairness and
reciprocity concerns hold when minimum wage proposals come from the workers and are not
exogenously imposed, and how it may alter their perception of what is a fair wage.
Our design follows Fehr et al (1993) and the game has two stages. The first stage is a
one-sided oral auction in which employers and workers exchange one unit of labor time.
Employers act as bidders: they propose a wage12 and do not have the opportunity to choose
the worker. Meanwhile, employees act as sellers. If the worker accepts the offer, the contract
is concluded. If it is not accepted, the employer can change the bid in an additional round
with the new one being higher than the previous highest unaccepted bid. The first stage lasts
three minutes. If some traders cannot conclude a contract, they earn zero profits in this period.
In the second stage, workers determine the value of the good for the buyers choosing
an effort level anonymously (their choice is revealed only to their employer to eliminate
group pressure effects) and without any constraint (there are no sanctions associated with the
effort chosen). As in Fehr et al (1993) we run four sessions for the BASE and EXO treatment.
We ran five sessions in the ENDO treatment in order to have enough data for different levels
of minimum wage proposed. Finally, each session has twelve periods.
In all sessions there are more workers than firms (nine workers and six firms or
employers)13. The excess supply of workers is to give the competitive theory its best shot.
Either party does not know the identity of their trading partners. This avoids any reputation
effects. Further, no labor market terms are used, employers are called buyers, workers are
called sellers, the wage is called a price and the effort level is called the quality level. Each

12

It has to be multiple of five in order not to put a commission fee. It enables workers to earn a small amount of
money at marginal trades.
13
Unfortunately, two subjects did not show up for the third session of the BASE and, for the fourth session of
the EXO treatments. We had eight workers and five firms in these sessions. Further, in the third and fourth
sessions of the ENDO treatment there were eight workers and six firms.
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participant knew how profits are computed and were given sufficient time to read the
instructions carefully and to ask questions.
The experiments lasted for two hours including the instructions14. All subjects were
(randomly selected) volunteer15 students recruited by e-mail and participate for the first time
in such an experiment (each agent could only participate in one session). Before the
beginning of a session, each subject had to draw a card that determined if she will be a seller
or a buyer. Workers and employers were in separate rooms. In each room the supervisor
transmitted the bids, acceptances and effort messages using Google chat to the experimenter
in the other room16.
Subjects were paid a 3 euro show up fees in addition to the profits they earned during
the experiment. Experimental Money (EM) was used for the purpose of the experiment with
an exchange rate of 45 units of EM to 1 Euro. All workers are identical and the payoff of a
worker j is:
uj = pj - c - m(ej),

(1)

Where, p is the wage, e is the effort level provided by the worker, c = 26 (constant) is the
monetary cost of providing one unit of labor time and, m(e) is the monetary effort cost. The
payoff of an employer i is:
πi = (v - pi)ei,

(2)

Where v = 126 is a valuation given exogenously. The assumption that effort interacts with
price in the payoff of the employers had been made to avoid losses and analyze only fairness
concerns. The monetary effort cost schedule is given by the following table (it is the same for
all workers):
Table I: Monetary Effort Cost Schedule

14

Appendix A.
ORSEE was used for subject recruiting.
16
This is very similar to Fehr et al (1993) where wage proposals are made using telephones.
15
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Utilities, payoff functions of the firms, cost efforts and the values of all parameters are public
information in both treatments.
Note that since the Fair Labor Standards Act was passed in 1938, the minimum wage
has been fixed at about 50% of the observed average wage (closer to 55% in the 1950s and
1960s, 40% in the 1990s)17,18. In our BASE treatment the observed average wage is equal to
59.95. Following this rule the minimum wage in the EXO should be equal to 29.98. This is
very close to our choice of the minimum wage at the competitive level of 30.

Prediction with Money-Maximizing Agents
Money-maximizing agents have no incentives to choose an effort level higher than the
minimum one as effort is costly and workers cannot be punished for providing low effort. If
firms assume that agents are money-maximizers they do not have incentives to offer wages
above the equilibrium wage level. With parameters values of, v = 126 and c = 26 one should
expect that wages converge to the competitive equilibrium level of 30. Note that if some
workers receive a wage level > 30 then some traders are involuntary rationed.

The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis
Hypotheses 1 to 3 are the same as in Fehr et al. (1993).
HYPOTHESIS 1: The effort level is increasing in the wage.

17

Minimum Wages, Employment, and the Distribution of Income. Charles Brown. Handbook of Labor
Economics, Volume 3, edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, Chapter 32. University of Michigan and NBER.
18
Minimum Wage Laws: Are They Overrated? Charles Brown. Journal of Economic Perspectives- Volume 2,
Number 3- Summer 1988-Pages 133-145.
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HYPOTHESIS 2: Average wages are considerably higher than the market-clearing wage. If
the game is repeated the wages do not converge to the market wage.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The average effort is above the minimum one and if the game is repeated
it does not converge to the minimum one.

We add two additional hypotheses resulting from our minimum wage treatments.
HYPOTHESIS 4: If the introduction of a minimum wage provides a reference point to
employers it should lower wage offers.
HYPOTHESIS 5: If final accepted wage offer is lower than the initial wage proposal then
effort is negatively impacted.
Our first basic analysis of the data is the same as the one in Fehr et al. (1993). The
OLS regression to test the First Hypothesis is19:
e = α+ βp + μ,

(3)

Hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected if β is significantly greater than zero. In the experiment
agents do not know the effort levels chosen by their partners, as a result they cannot adjust
their individual notion of fairness to a common market level. To take into account the
possibility of agents having different ideas of what is a fair response to a wage offer a dummy
variable di is introduced for workers and we fit the following regression:
e = ∑i γi di + βp + μ,

(4)

Following this we test if all estimated γi are equal to the estimated α of the first
regression to analyze for the significance of behavioral differences among workers. We also
test if effort varies systematically between periods using a period dummy pt and running the
following regression:

19

All regressions to test the fifth hypotheses are estimated with OLS. We also ran two sided censored Tobit
regressions to take into account the ceiling in the possible values the dependent variable can assume. The results
do not differ. Tobit regressions are available upon request. We also do a non parametric test to test the equality
in populations (Kruskall Wallis equality of population rank test). Our results are robust to these tests.
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e = ∑tθt pt + βp + μ,

(5)

Again, we test with linear restrictions if there are significant differences between all
estimated θt and the original estimated α of the first regression. To test the Second and the
Third Hypotheses we look an Average Relative Overpayment (as defined in Fehr et al.,
1993):
r = (p0 - c - τ)/(v - c)

(6)

Where, τ = 30 – c and p0 is the average wage in the period. If Hypothesis 2 is true, r should
be greater than zero and should not converge to zero.
To test the Fourth and Fifth Hypotheses we perform t tests to compare the Average
Wage, the Average Effort Level, the Average Relative Overpayment and the Average
Efficiency of the two treatments. If Hypotheses 4 and 5 are true, the difference in mean of the
Average Wage and the Average Effort Level should be significant.
Finally to test hypothesis 5 we will run the following regression.
ei=+ di+(ai-pi) +i

(7)

Where, ei is the effort for agent i, di is a dummy which take value 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the
individual offer, ai, is greater than pi (what agents finally accept). The second term, (ai-pi),
captures whether the individual offer is above or below the final accepted wage offer. The last
term is the cross product between the second and third term in the regression. The idea behind
regression (7) is that if agents take their wage proposals as an implicit entitlement then any
accepted offer under this reference point should impact effort negatively.
Finally (as in Fehr et al.) we analyze efficiency. When two participants conclude a
transaction (there is a match between firm i and worker j), the sum of their gains is defined as:
Gij = πi + uj = (v - pi)ej + pi - c - m(ej).

(8)

Standard theory predicts the minimum effort and a wage equal to τ + c, therefore, with
the values of the parameters chosen in Fehr et al. (1993) the joint benefits are:
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Gs = (v - c - τ ) emin + τ = 0.1 * 96 + 4 = 13.6

(9)

Note that Gs is lower than the maximum Gij that can be achieved: i.e. there is a
conflict between individual and joint benefits. If fairness considerations exist then this
discrepancy may be decreased. We use fij as a measure of efficiency of a transaction between
firm i and worker j.
fij = Gij/Gs,

(10)

Standard theory predicts a fij = 1 but the highest possible value of fij is 7.29 when p = 125.
Therefore fij assumes values between 1 and 7.29.

3. Main Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics.
Henceforth we will refer to prices as wages, sellers as workers, buyers as employers
and quality level as effort level. In the BASE and the EXO treatments 275 wages were
accepted out of 276 wage offers meanwhile, 359 wages were accepted out of 360 (wage
offers) in the ENDO treatment. The lowest observed wage was 2520 in the BASE, 30 in the
EXO and 1021 in the ENDO experiments. Interestingly, the proportion of wage offers at the
competitive level (the non-binding minimum wage) is much higher in the EXO and ENDO
than in the BASE experiments. In the EXO and ENDO treatments, 17% and 14% of the offers
are observed at the competitive wage of 30, respectively; while only 5% of them are observed
in the BASE experiments. Finally, the highest wage is 95 in the BASE and 120 both, in the
EXO and ENDO treatments.

20

This was observed once in the first period of the first session, another in the last period of the second session
and another in the tenth period of the third session. Even though these prices give negative benefits to the sellers
they accepted them.
21
This was observed once in the fifth period of the second session. It is worth noting that in the ENDO there
were also offers of 15, 20 and 25 that even though those wages give negative benefits for the sellers, they
accepted them.
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Even though there are more workers than firms, lowest wage offers were sometimes
rejected by the workers forcing the employers to increase their wage offer22. We also observe
that when a firm improves upon a rejected offer the worker chooses a lower conversion rate
to punish the firm for her earlier low offer.
The overall average wage offer in all sessions of each treatment was 59.95, 54.37 and
65.84 in the BASE,EXO and ENDO23 treatments respectively. The average wage offer in the
minimum wage treatment (EXO) is significantly lower (p=0.00002)24 than observed in the
baseline experiments (BASE). Our results clearly show that the introduction of a minimum
wage shifts offers downwards. This result suggests that exogenously imposed institutions that
provide reference points can crowd out private fairness. Interestingly, the opposite happens
when an endogenous minimum wage is introduced, i.e. the average wage in the ENDO
treatment is significantly higher than what is observed in the BASE (p=0.0004) experiments.
Endogenous wage proposals seem to have a positive effect on the average wage offer.
Looking at effort one finds that the average effort chosen by the workers is 0.27, 0.28
and 0.22 in the, BASE, EXO and ENDO experiments, respectively. These levels are almost
three times as high as predicted by the money maximizing theory. Further, even though
wages are lower in the EXO treatment, the average effort is not significantly affected. The
difference in means across the BASE and EXO experiments in the average effort level is not
statistically significant (t-test: p=0.6811). More surprising are the results in the ENDO
treatment where the average wage offer is significantly higher than in BASE and the average
effort is significantly lower (t-test: p=0.0033). One explanation for this may be that workers
may develop a perception of entitlements while making wage proposals. Subsequently, if the
wage proposals (or worker expectations) are not matched, workers may respond by lowering

22

In all treatments, one offer of thirty was not accepted. In those periods where the wage is not accepted this
firm does not participate in the market, therefore only five transactions were concluded.
23
The wage offers we obtain are lower than observed in Fehr et al. who obtain an average wage offer of 72.
24
It is also confirmed by a Kruskal Wallis test. Results available on request.
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effort25. Interestingly, we observe that the effort level decreases as the difference between the
wage proposal and the wage offer increases (see figure III).
It is interesting that the imposition of an exogenously imposed minimum wage and an
endogenous wage proposal has opposing effects. The competitive minimum wage provides a
reference point to the employers’ that negatively affects wage offers meanwhile, effort levels
are maintained. The effect of endogenous wage proposals is negative on worker effort levels,
however, average wage increases. As earlier mentioned effort levels may decrease as the
workers feel entitled to the wage proposals and upon not getting them negatively reciprocate
by lowering effort levels. It is, however, not clear why average wage offers increase under
endogenous wage proposals, and don´t go down in response to lower effort levels. It is
possible that, as in the EXO treatment, employers try to elicit higher effort through higher
wage signals.
Figure I: Cumulative Distribution Function. BASE versus EXO and ENDO
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Looking at the wage frequency distribution for the three treatments (figure I) we can
see that in the EXO treatment, 38.41 % of the final offers are between 30 and 45, 22.84% in
the ENDO treatment, while only 19.50% of them are in this interval in the BASE. Both the
EXO and ENDO treatment result in leftward shift of the distribution of wage offers. Though,
the shift is greater for the exogenously imposed minimum wage institution.
The introduction of an exogenously imposed competitive minimum wage decreases
wage offers. It seems that the imposition of the exogenous minimum wage institution alters
the reference point of wage offers towards the minimum wage resulting in lower wage offers.
As a result, higher effort levels are not reciprocated with higher wages. We observe the
opposite in the ENDO treatment, that is, high wage offers are not reciprocated with high
effort. These results are interesting, as they point out that higher wages in the BASE treatment
with respect to the EXO were not being offered purely due to reciprocity concerns. If
reciprocity concerns were important than the imposition of the minimum wage should not
have altered wage offers as they should have reciprocated to high effort.
We now look at the observed average and median effort levels of workers for given
wage intervals. There is a general increasing trend in both average and median effort with
wages in all the treatments (see Figure II). However, the average (and median) effort levels in
the endogenous wage treatment are lower than in the BASE and EXO treatments (as
mentioned before, the difference in means across the BASE and EXO experiments in the
average effort level is not statistically significant (t-test: p=0.6811). However, the average
effort is significantly lower in the ENDO compared with the BASE (t-test: p=0.0033). We
summarize our first main result below.

Result 1: The effort level is increasing in wage for all treatments (BASE, EXO and ENDO).
We fail to reject Hypothesis 1.

16

Given that the wage effort relation varies across treatments we further analyze the data
for possible structural breaks as wages increase. Looking at structural breaks helps entangle
differences in wage-effort relation for the high and low wage-effort groups. We do this by
pooling the data of the four sessions together for each treatment and then dividing the data in
the corresponding wage-effort pairs for wages lower, and higher, than 60. These intervals are
chosen as a great proportion of wage offers26 are between 30 and 90.
Figure II: Average Effort – Wage Relation
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Table II: Results of the regression e = α+βp+μ

BASE Low Wage
level
BASE High Wage
level
EXO Low Wage level
EXO High Wage level
ENDO Low Wage
level
ENDO High Wage
level
26

N

α

p(α)

SD(α)

β

p(β)

SD(β)

R2

144

0.019

0.756

0.062

0.004

0.002***

0.001

0.067

131

0.190

0.331

0.197

0.002

0.468

0.003

0.004

188
87

0.037
0.039

0.507
0.836

0.056
0.189

0.004
0.005

0.000***
0.033**

0.001
0.003

0.067
0.052

170

0.005

0.922

0.466

0.004

0.000***

0.001

0.077

189

0.103

0.297

0.098

0.002

0.074

0.001

0.017

Except for a few outliers at 25 or 100.
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One can see in table II that the β-coefficient in the BASE treatment is statistically
different from zero only for lower wages but not for higher ones. This is interesting as it tells
us that the effort level is responsive to wage increase only at lower levels. The relationship,
however, does not hold for higher wage levels. We obtain a similar result in the ENDO
treatment where β-coefficient is statistically different from zero only for lowest wages but not
for the highest ones. This is, however, not the case in the EXO treatment where the βcoefficient is statistically different from zero for both groups of wages suggesting a positive
relation at both low and high wage levels. Our results suggest that reciprocal behavior may
not be prevalent across all wage-effort levels. It seems that increase in wages from lower
levels are reciprocated, however, wage (effort) increases at higher levels are not equally
reciprocated. We observe this behavior in the BASE and the ENDO treatments, and the not in
the EXO treatment.
To further understand the wage effort relationship we now analyze the behavior of
average effort and average wage across periods in the three treatments. In figure III we can
see that wage offers start at similar levels in all the treatments. However, in the EXO
treatment they decline till the fourth period and then stabilize again. From the fourth period
onwards, the average wage in the EXO treatment is always smaller than in the control
although, it is still significantly above the minimum wage. Looking at the wage offers in the
EXO treatment one notices that the wage starts declining once one buyer chooses the
minimum wage. This then triggers similar offers from other subjects. It seems that most
buyers are reluctant to be the first movers but, are eager followers. In the case of the ENDO
treatment we observe that there is an increasing gap between the minimum wage proposals
and the wage offers. The wage offers decline as the minimum wage proposals increase. The
wage proposals have an effect upon wage offers that goes in the opposite direction. In all
treatments average wages are significantly above the minimum wage of 30.
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Result 2: Average wages are considerably higher than the market-clearing wage.
Furthermore, wages do not converge to the market wage for the duration of the experiment.
We fail to reject Hypothesis 2.

Figure III: Evolution of Average Effort Levels
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Now, we look at the average effort (Figure IV) chosen over time. While, the behaviour
of average effort is similar across all three treatments there is a difference of trends across
treatments. Relative to the BASE experiments there is a strong negative trend both in the
EXO and ENDO treatment. In figure IV one can clearly see that the average effort is above
the minimum level and does not converge to it in the repeated game. We can see that average
effort is above 0.1 in all periods.
Pooling data from all sessions in the BASE treatment we find that the evolution of the
Average Effort Level presents a (statistically) significant trend at 10% significance level
(p=0.0574). There is, however, a statistically significant negative trend at 5% (p=0.008) in
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the EXO treatment. Moreover, the first half of the trend is greater than the overall trend
(statistically significant at 10%: p=0.081). A similar result is obtained in the ENDO, i.e. there
is a statistically significant negative trend (p=0.0005) and the first half of the trend is greater
than the overall trend (statistically significant at 5%: p=0.03). This again confirms that effort
levels increase by a greater proportion for lower wage levels.

Figure IV: Evolution of Average Effort Levels
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We can thus conclude that even though the minimum wage does not decrease the
average effort level for the BASE and EXO treatments. However, the imposition of the
minimum wage creates a negative trend in the evolution of the reciprocity of workers. This
effect is of a greater magnitude in the short run. Interestingly, the effect is stronger in the
ENDO experiments. In addition to a negative trend; a reduction in the average effort level
(with respect to BASE) is also observed. These results show that fairness concerns are being
crowded out as the experiment progresses in both the EXO and ENDO treatments.
Hypothesis 3 is supported for the BASE experiments, but not for the EXO or ENDO
treatments. We summarize these results below.
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Result 3:The average effort is above the minimum effort level and does not converge to the
minimum effort in the repeated game in the BASE treatment.

Finally we analyze the Average Relative Overpayment (ARO). Defined as r = (p0-c-τ)/(v-c),
ARO represents the percentage of surplus employers give to their workers. According to the
Money-Maximizing Agents Theory this should be zero as there is an excess supply of
workers in the market. Note that if ARO is lower in the minimum wage treatment this
signifies crowding out of private fairness. As observed for effort levels, ARO declines across
both the BASE and the EXO treatments. It is 0.302 in the BASE and 0.246 in the EXO
treatment27. The difference of ARO across the two treatments is also statistically significant
(p=0.008). Comparing across treatments we find that ARO is 0.302 in the BASE experiments
while, it is 0.359 in the ENDO experiments. The difference is statistically significant at the
1% confidence level (p=0.003)28. These results show that under the endogenous wage
proposal institution employers, on average, share a higher proportion of the surplus than
under the BASE or EXO experiments.

3.2. Regression Analysis
We now explore our results in detail. To investigate whether the effort level is increasing in
wage29 (Hypothesis 1) we run an OLS and a Tobit regression with the effort level (wage)
being the dependent (independent) variable. We obtain similar results for both estimations
and thus only report the OLS regressions. One can see the results of the first regression in
Table III for the BASE, EXO and ENDO treatments.
One can see (Table III) that the β-coefficient in the regression for Hypothesis 1 is
positive and significant in all of the regressions30. This tells us that the effort level depends

Fehr et al. (1993) obtain an ARO of 0.42.
We shed more light on this later where we look at the evolution of ARO across the experimental periods.
29
We use the same approach as in Fehr et al. (2006).
30
Except in the regression for the last period in the BASE and EXO treatments.
27
28
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positively on wages. These results are along the line of the main result in Fehr et al. (1993).
Further note that the introduction of the minimum wage decreases the standard deviation (SD)
of wages in almost all the regressions31. This is along the line of the results in the empirical
literature where they show that the imposition of wage institutions decreases wage dispersion.
In our case we observe this as the imposition of the minimum wage institution lowers wage
offers from above.
Table III: Results of the regression e = α+βp+μ32
N

α

p(α)

S1-4
SL1-4
S1
S2
S3
S4

275
23
72
72
59
72

-0.0040
0.0465
0.0403
0.0063
0.0575
0.0313

0.9338
0.6147
0.4128
0.9534
0.5891
0.8009

S1-4
SL1-4
S1
S2
S3
S4

275
23
72
71
72
60

0.0299
0.1384
0.0876
-0.0609
-0.0663
0.0688

0.4312
0.1028
0.2081
0.3824
0.4480
0.5074

S1-5
SL1-5
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5

359
30
72
72
72
71
72

0.0423
-0.0068
0.1358
0.0520
-0.0245
-0.0209
0.1142

0.1435
0.9089
0.2380
0.4247
0.5338
0.7470
0.0113

SD(α)
β
p(β)
BASE Treatment
0.0479 0.0046 0.0000***
0.0910 0.0021 0.1578
0.0489 0.0025 0.0070***
0.1082 0.0040 0.0220**
0.1059 0.0055 0.0020***
0.1236 0.0039 0.0367**
EXO Treatment
0.0379 0.0046 0.0000***
0.0811 0.0005 0.7235
0.0689 0.0037 0.0124**
0.0693 0.0059 0.0000***
0.0868 0.0051 0.0003***
0.1031 0.0051 0.0047***
ENDO Treatment
0.0288 0.0028 0.0000***
0.0586 0.0030 0.0036***
0.1141 0.0017 0.3197
0.0648 0.0024 0.0074***
0.0392 0.0038 0.0000***
0.0647 0.0041 0.0000***
0.0439 0.0011 0.0714*

SD(β)

R2

0.0008
0.0014
0.0009
0.0017
0.0017
0.0019

0.1132
0.0927
0.0994
0.0727
0.1549
0.0608

0.0007
0.0015
0.0015
0.0012
0.0014
0.0017

0.1464
0.0061
0.0861
0.2509
0.1684
0.1299

0.0004
0.0009
0.0018
0.0009
0.0006
0.0009
0.0006

0.1130
0.2650
0.0141
0.0980
0.3480
0.2523
0.0457

As in Fehr et al (1993) we run a regression with a dummy variable for each agent.
This is done to take into account the possibility of differences in notions of fairness between
agents. In our experiments agents do not have the possibility of knowing the effort level
31

The SD does not decrease in the regression of the last periods in the BASE and in the first session regressions'
of the BASE and the EXO.
32
S#: Session #; SL1-4: Results of the estimation with the last period data of all sessions; N: Number of
observations; p(): p-value of the relevant coefficients; SD(): Standard Deviation of the relevant coefficients; R2:
Adjusted coefficient of determination.
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chosen by their partners, as a result none of them can adjust their notion of fairness to a
common market level. We find that the intercept is significantly different among agents,
meaning that the notion of fairness differs among individuals. This is obtained for all
treatments.
Now, it is possible that the effort level of the agents varies systematically across
periods. As in Fehr et al (1993) we introduce a period dummy pt. We confirm the result (Fehr
et al.), that the behavior according to the effort level between periods is not significantly
different in the BASE. This, however, is not the case in the EXO and ENDO treatments
where we find that the effort level systematically varies across periods. This could be due to
the fact buyers adjust slowly to the minimum wage announcement. Once the first offer is
made at the minimum wage others follow suit. In the ENDO treatment the reason is different,
as the wage proposal is updated every few periods agents adjust their effort level given that
and the wage offers they receive. It could be due to this that we observe differences in effort
levels across periods both in the EXO and in the ENDO treatments.
We now look at the evolution of the Average Relative Overpayment per period
(Figure V). Recall that this is the proportion of the surplus given to workers33. We find that
the Average Relative Overpayment is (statistically) significantly greater than zero in all
treatments34.
Analyzing all sessions together ARO has no statistically significant negative trend
neither in the BASE nor in the ENDO treatments (p=0.338 and p=0.094 respectively). The
opposite happens in the EXO treatment where there is a negative trend and, moreover, it is
greater in the first half of the treatment (p=0.005). This suggests that employers share a
smaller proportion of the surplus with the workers as the experiment progresses when the

33
34

The theoretical prediction is that they should get zero.
BASE vs EXO (p value=0.008), BASE vs ENDO (p value=0.008), EXO vs ENDO (p value=0.000).
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minimum wage is imposed exogenously. This clearly implies that the minimum wage
treatment affects income distribution negatively.
The introduction of the non-binding minimum wage significantly reduces the Average
Relative Overpayment. The Average Relative Overpayment is 0.3023 in the BASE and
0.2463 in the EXO experiments and is statistically significant at the 10% level (p=0.008).
This further lends support to the assertion that the minimum wage institution crowds out
private fairness. Even though effort levels do not decline, average relative overpayment is
significantly lower in the EXO treatment. On the other hand, the effect is just the opposite
with the introduction of the endogenous minimum wage. In the ENDO treatment ARO is
greater than in the BASE (ARO in ENDO = 0.3586) and this difference is statistically
significant (p=0.003).

Figure V: Evolution of the Average Relative Overpayment across periods
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Now, we analyze whether the introduction of the non-binding exogenous minimum
wage negatively affects wage offers. We do this by looking at the mean difference of wages
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between treatments. We find that the introduction of a non binding minimum wage makes
firms significantly reduce wage offers (p=0.00). As explained before, the opposite happens in
the ENDO treatment where agents use the minimum price as a signal to induce firms to offer
greater wages which results in a higher average wage offer(p=0.00).
Result 4: The introduction of the non-binding exogenous minimum wage reduces average
wage offers in the EXO treatment. Meanwhile, average wage offers are greater in the ENDO
treatment. Hypothesis 4 is partially supported by our data.
Even though average wage offers decline average effort is not significantly affected
when we compare the BASE with the EXO treatment. Even though the average wage offer
increases in the ENDO treatment with respect to the BASE, average effort is reduced. Our
results thus reject Hypothesis 5 that states that effort levels should also decline if average
wage declines. The Average Effort Level is 0.27 in the BASE and 0.28 in the EXO
experiments. Though this difference is not statistically significant, the increase in average
effort as average wage declines suggests workers use higher effort levels as a signaling device
to obtain higher wages35. Contrarily, in the ENDO it seems that agents respond with smaller
effort levels when firms do not offer wages in the line with their wage proposal. It seems that
the presence of a non-binding wage proposal institution instills expectations of entitlements
among employees. When they are not met, workers respond by lowering effort. This is an
example of negative reciprocity in the case when worker expectations are not realized.
Result 5: Average effort does not decline with the decrease in wages in the EXO treatment.
Average effort levels across the BASE and EXO treatments are not significantly different.
However, average effort declines in the ENDO treatment. Hypothesis 5 is not supported by
our data.

35

Some subjects asked us this question during the experiment.
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Finally, we run the regression in equation (7) (ei=+ di+(ai-pi)+i). This regression
also provides one of the more interesting results in our paper. Here we check for the relation
between effort levels (ei) and the difference between the wage proposals (ai) and the final
accepted offer (pi) in the ENDO treatment. This regression allows us to see whether negative
effort is due to the fact workers wage expectations are not fulfilled. Our results are presented
in table-IV below. Where both coefficients  and are negative (-0.05198 and -0.00402)
and significant at 10 and 5%, respectively (p-value, 0.0816 and 0.0457).This result shows that
effort is negatively related with wage expectations. Making a wage proposal seems to give
workers wage entitlements and when not reciprocated are negatively reciprocated through
lower effort levels.
Table IV: ENDO Treatment
Results of the regression ei=+ di+(ai-pi) +i
Variable





Coefficient
0.354
-0.0415
-0.0025

SD
0.0249
0.02653
0.00033

t statistic
14.205
-1.566
-7.377

p-value
0.000
0.1179
0.0000***

Situations like the one studied above are not rare. Worker involvement in the
management process is common. Workers sit in the boardrooms as representatives and make
proposals towards firm functioning. Our result is interesting as it points out that in situations
where wage proposals are made, the proposer feels entitled to the proposed wage and upon
not getting it responds negatively by expending less effort. It is clear that the perception of
entitlements in this sense impacts incentives and efficiency of the system.
Finally, we present another interesting result on the effect on efficiency. Stigler (1946)
commented that the introduction of minimum wage will result in resource misallocation36.

36

Stigler, 1946, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation. American Economic Review 36: 358-365.
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We find that total efficiency decreases in the EXO treatment where, average efficiency37fij is
3.28, while it is 3.60 in the BASE treatment. The difference between both treatments is
statistically significant (p=0.003). The reduction in efficiency (as well as the one in the wages
offered and the relative overpayment) is another of the negative consequences of the
introduction of the exogenous fairness based institution. The opposite happens in the ENDO
treatment. Compared with the BASE, average efficiency increases; now it is 3.74, even
though, this difference with the BASE is not statistically significant (p=0.25). We can
conclude that the introduction of the endogenous minimum wage increase the average wage
offer and the Relative Overpayment. It also marginally increases efficiency even though the
increment is not significant.

4. Conclusion:
Labor markets across the world have different institutional arrangements regarding
wage bargaining, working hours, overtime payment etc. that can importantly impact
outcomes. One such example is the minimum wage legislation that was first enacted, and
later emulated in several developed countries, with a similar argument. Most wage setting
institutions are imposed keeping fairness concerns in mind. Meanwhile, other wage setting
institutions are set to give the workers some say in the wage setting process.
In this paper we first experimentally study the effect of the minimum wage
(exogenously and endogenously determined) in a gift exchange experiment. We first
successfully replicate the results of Fehr et al (1993) where private fairness concerns
effectively prevent wages from decreasing to the market-clearing level: firms take into
account that the effort level of workers depends on wages when they make their wage offers
and higher wages are reciprocated with high effort. We then introduce a non-binding

37

Recall that the standard theory predicts a level of efficiency equal to 1.
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minimum wage at the competitive wage. We find that average wage levels are lower than in
the control experiments. However, average effort levels do not decline correspondingly. It
seems that even though private fairness is crowded out, i.e. lower wage offers are obtained;
workers still offer higher effort levels. The distribution of wages offered shifts to the left, with
a substantial proportion of the offers (38.41%) near the minimum wage levels.
We find that the minimum wage institution crowds out private fairness resulting in
lower wage offers. Further, average relative overpayment and the efficiency gains that
fairness creates are also diminished. Finally, it also creates a negative trend in the evolution of
effort levels workers reciprocate firms with. It seems that effort is also negatively affected in
the long run.
We further run experiments looking at a simplified version of a wage proposal
institution where workers make an average wage proposal to the firms. Such an institution
reflects the various wage bargaining institutions where both sides of a sector negotiate wage
increases or minimum wage levels. We find that this institution has several interesting
properties. It seems that allowing the workers to propose a minimum acceptable wage results
in certain expectations regarding wage which, when not met, result in lower effort (negative
reciprocity). Average wage offers increase in this framework and are above the (free market)
control experiments. Surprisingly, the higher wage levels result in negative reciprocity when
wage offers do not coincide with average wage proposals. It seems that it is not only the wage
level but also the wage expectation that plays a role. In this sense, and in spite of the higher
average wage, the endogenous minimum wage crowds out positive reciprocity.
Our experiments show that one can study different institutional arrangements in an
experimental setup and study how they impact outcomes. It would be interesting to see how
institutional structures alter the well known gift exchange result under different institutional
arrangements. We are already working on some of these extensions.
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